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I.

Introduction

During March 2014 the world witnessed one of the most overt signs of geo-political aggression since the
end of the Cold War. It was during this month that the Russian Federation formally annexed the
previously Ukrainian territory of Crimea. This event resulted in ripples throughout the international
community, drawing strong condemnation from the United States (U.S.), European Union (EU),
Australia, Japan, and many other countries (Khlebnikov 2014). Eventually, in response to perceived
Russian expansion, these countries placed economic sanctions upon Russia for its actions (Dreyer and
Popescu 2014) The purpose of these sanctions was to showcase displeasure with Russian involvement in
Ukraine and Crimea and ultimately to persuade Russia to allow Crimea to remain a part of Ukraine
(Newsroom – European Commission 2017). In retaliation, Russia enacted counter sanctions within the
agricultural sector against sanctioning countries (Reuters 2016). With the resulting deterioration of
Russian relations with Western nations, these sanctions are among the most important topics in the
international relations sphere. As these sanctions were so recently enacted, there has been little study of
the resulting economic effects of these sanctions on EU countries. As there are many EU countries who
rely heavily upon trade with Russia for energy, defense, and financial products, it is safe to assume that
there should be some form of loss trade for these countries. This loss trade should be magnified for
countries as one moves geographically closer to Russia due to existing trade ties.
This is the purpose of my study, to better equip foreign policy makers to better understand the
consequences of the 2014 Russian Sanctions for countries that choose to enact them. By adding to
knowledge of potential unintentional effects of the 2014 Russian Sanctions, I hope to spur more informed
conversations amongst foreign policy makers worldwide.
Russia, at 41% of total trade, is the EU’s number one trading partner. Many Eastern European nations
especially rely upon Russia for energy imports due to Russia’s large involvement in energy markets (BBC
News 2014). By analyzing the relationships between EU nations and Russia within the energy sector, I
aim to answer the following question: did the 2014 Russian Sanctions result in a positive price effect on
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the average price of unleaded and diesel fuel for EU nations highly dependent upon Russian crude oil
imports? My alternative hypothesis (𝐻1 ) expects the 2014 Russian Sanctions to result in a price effect on
the average monthly price of unleaded and diesel fuel for EU nations highly dependent on Russian crude
oil imports. My null hypothesis (𝐻 0 ) outlines my expectation that the 2014 Russian Sanctions had no
price effect on the average monthly price of unleaded and diesel fuel for my tested nations.
To explore the effects of the 2014 Russian Sanctions, I have conducted a difference-in-differences
analysis of historical unleaded and diesel gasoline prices. I have done this by forming two groups of
nations from a 14-nation sample that will analyze the difference in gasoline prices between heavily reliant
EU nations and nations that are less reliant on Russian oil imports. My data for my 14 EU nations spans
from 2008 – 2015 and will focus on the average monthly price of unleaded and diesel gasoline. By
looking at the interaction effect of time periods after the September 8th enactment of EU sanctions and EU
nations that import 50% or more of their crude oil from Russia, I aim to identify and isolate any
unintentional price increases resulting from the 2014 Russian Sanctions.
After testing my differences-in-difference model, my results were inconclusive for this current iteration.
My model resulted in a holistically statistically significant result, however my difference-in-differences
interaction variable, built to measure the effect of the sanctions on gasoline prices, was statistically
insignificant. Therefore, I cannot reject the null hypothesis (𝐻 0 ). Despite not being able to identify if the
2014 Russian Sanctions resulted in a positive price effect on the average monthly unleaded and diesel
gasoline for highly dependent countries, this is still an informative result. This result leads me to believe
that the EU use of international sanctions in response to Russian involvement in the 2014 Ukrainian
Revolution did not lead to unintentional economic harm for European gasoline consumers. The increase
in costs resulting from sanctions for Russian energy firms (Rosneft, Transneft, and Gazprom Neft) was
not passed onto end users in the EU in a statistically significant manner. Other explanations for my
findings include the possibility that due to simultaneous increases in the global supply of oil and
decreases in global demand, EU gasoline consumers did not bear any unintentional price increases
resulting from the 2014 Russian Sanctions.
5

II.

Institutional Background
a. Historical-Political Background

Since the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the countries of Eastern Europe previously
behind the Iron Curtain have endeavored to establish strong market economies. Some of these nations
have been extremely successful, like Poland and the Czech Republic, while others have encountered
developmental resistance, such as Bulgaria (D. William 2-27, 28-30). Despite transitional challenges,
most countries in Eastern Europe have implemented strong democratic, legal, and economic institutions
that have allowed them to effectively contribute to the European and global economies. As a symbol of
these successes, 11 Central and Eastern European countries now count themselves as integrated parts of
the EU. This integration with Western Europe has diversified economic ties and allowed Central and
Eastern European nations to reduce dependency on Russia for economic health. In the same way, many of
these Central and Eastern European nations value national and economic sovereignty highly due to
memories of Soviet aggression in the 20th century (European Conference of Presidents of Parliament
2014). For the past 25 years, this sovereignty has not been challenged, but in recent years, this has begun
to be challenged again.
On March 18, 2014, Russia annexed the previously Ukrainian territory of Crimea (TASS 2014). The
annexation of this territory followed several significant political events in Ukraine, including the 2014
Ukrainian Revolution and Russian military intervention in the Crimean Peninsula (Gros and Mustilli
2016). The 2014 Ukrainian Revolution was initiated due to fears that the newly elected Ukrainian
president, Viktor Yanukovych, desired to establish stronger ties with Russia. In the early months of 2014,
riots broke out across the country to express displeasure with Yanukovych, which ultimately culminated
in the development of a new government and the resignation and ousting of Yanukovych. During this
chaos, Crimea opted to attempt to secede from Ukraine to seek annexation by the Russian Federation.
This led Vladimir Putin, the Russian Prime Minister, to authorize military intervention within Crimea to
secure the territory. Soon, unmarked Russian troops occupied large swaths of Crimea, stabilizing the
peninsula (Yuhas 2014). By early March 2014, Crimea was under Russian control (Parfitt 2015). These
6

movements led to widespread backlash from many Western governments, amidst claims that the Russian
Federation had illegitimately invaded Crimea to pursue expansionistic goals (Gros and Mustilli 2016).
The specific details of whether Russian control of Crimea is legitimate continues to be a topic of great
debate to this day, and is worthy of further analysis. However, this question is one not addressed by the
scope of this paper. Following the establishment of Russian control of the Crimean Peninsula, the newly
formed Pro-Russian Crimean government petitioned the Kremlin for annexation and inclusion within the
Russian Federation. On March 18th, 2014, this petition was formerly granted, and Crimea ceased to be a
part of Ukraine and became a part of Russia (TASS 2014).
In the following days, Western governments analyzed the military actions of Russia within the context of
the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution and communicated with the new Ukrainian government in Kiev. Together,
they deemed Russian actions in the region as overtly aggressive and in violation of Ukrainian national
sovereignty (Newsroom – European Commission 2017). Thus, the United States, the EU, and Canada
decided to enact joint economic sanctions upon the Russian Federation for their role in the Crimean
Annexation/Invasion. The goals of economic sanctions in this context were three-fold: 1) to signal to
Russian and domestic audiences of dissatisfaction with Russian intervention in Crimea, 2) to constrain
Russia and Russian leaders from undertaking future actions in the region, and 3) to coerce the Russian
government into changing or reversing existing policies in Crimea (Dreyer and Popescu 2014). Initial
sanctions by the EU were instituted to pursue the first goal of signaling dissatisfaction with the Russian
government due to Russian military force in Crimea and the perceived violation of the September 6th
Minsk Ceasefire agreement (Dreyer and Popescu 2014). As these initial sanctions seemed to have little
effect upon the Russian Federation, more stringent sanctions were deemed necessary. Together, over the
course of the following months, the U.S., Canada, Switzerland, Norway, Australia, Japan, and many other
nations joined the EU in developing economic sanctions targeting the Russian Federation (Khlebnikov
2014). These sanctions culminated with the official EU enactment of their sanctions on September 8th,
2014 (EU Official Journal 2014). Due to the nature of these sanctions being similar across all enacting
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nations, and the focus of this study being the EU’s economic ties with Russia, the EU sanctions will be
primarily focused upon.
Summarized by Dreyer and Popescu of the European Union Institute for Security Studies, the EU
sanctions developed include the following restrictions:
1. asset freezes and visa bans on 132 persons and 28 companies or other entities in Russia/Ukraine
deemed responsible for the violation of Kiev’s territorial integrity.
2. the suspension of preferential economic development loans to Russia by the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).
3. a ban on trading bonds and equity and related brokering services for products whose maturity
period exceeds 30 days with some of Russia’s biggest state-controlled banks (including Sberbank
and Gazprombank), three Russian energy companies (including Rosneft, but not Gazprom in the
case of the EU), and three Russian defense companies.
4. a ban on loans to five major Russian state-owned banks.
5. a two-way arms embargo.
6. a ban on exports of so-called dual-use items, i.e. civilian industrial goods that can be used as (or
to produce) weaponry.
7. a ban on exporting certain energy equipment and providing specific energy-related services to
Russia’s new, innovative and technology intensive energy projects (e.g. Arctic and deep-water
exploration, shale oil).
To answer the sanctions imposed upon them, Russia developed their own counter-sanctions. These
counter-sanctions focused on restricting agricultural imports from the U.S. and EU. The sanctioned
products include dairy products, meat, fish, and fruit. They do not include wine and spirits, beverages, or
baby food (Stratfor 2015). The most important sanctions from the above list of EU sanctions are the first,
third, and seventh restrictions. These EU sanctions specifically target the major Russian energy firms
Rosneft, Transneft, and Gazprom Neft, and the politically powerful individuals associated with them
(BBC News 2014). By designing sanctions to restrict capital raising and access to international markets,
these sanctions severely hamper the financial flexibility of Rosneft, Transneft, and Gazprom Neft and
result in higher costs for them. U.S. sanctions effect these firms similarly, but as my study is focused on
EU sanctions, I will neglect further analysis of these sanctions (BBC News 2014). At the same time these
sanctions were enacted, global prices for oil were falling due to increases in global supply and decreases
in global demand, resulting in further harm to a Russian economy that relied on petroleum alone in 2014
for 63% of its total export value. (Tarver 2015, OEC 2017).
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In summary, it is simpler to view the entire set of sanctions through the lens of industries. EU sanctions
target Russian financial, defense, and energy markets. Russian counter-sanctions target Western
agricultural markets.

b. Current Situation & Motivation
To this day, EU sanctions and Russian counter-sanctions continue to be in effect. The effectiveness of
these sanctions to deter further Russian aggression are a point of spirited debate. A key facet that has yet
to undergo critical examination is the effect of the 2014 Russian Sanctions upon the economies of Eastern
European nations. Due to the geographical proximity of Central and Eastern European nations to Russia,
the comparative economic size of Russia to Central and Eastern European nations, and the still significant
trade ties between these nations and Russia, there is strong reason to believe that there may be unintended
positive price effects for Central and Eastern European economies (Szczepański 2015). Many European
nations particularly rely on Russia for energy imports because of low transportation costs resulting from
proximity and the strength of the Russian energy sector (BBC News 2014). In simple economic terms, my
logic is that the 2014 Russian Sanctions and countersanctions artificially increased costs within the
Russian energy, finance, and defense sectors. These higher costs may have then been ultimately passed
onto European nations particularly dependent on Russian imports, unintentionally harming these
European nations. An attempt to prove the existence of these unintended effects upon Central and Eastern
European economies will be the focus of this inquiry going forth.
As the sanctions continue to be in effect, this topic is a matter of only growing importance. With a new
administration coming to power in the U.S., there is discussion that the extension of Russian Sanctions
may be reevaluated, but at this time there has been no formal actions taken from either the U.S. or the EU
(Kriesberg and Zhang 2017). A similar sentiment is shared by Mr. Putin and the Russian Federation, with
no reconsideration of agricultural countersanctions in sight (Sputnik International 2015). For the
foreseeable future, it seems that Crimea-related sanctions will stay in place, and therefore continue to be a
point of extreme geo-political and economic tension for all affected nations (Shirreff 2016).
9

III.

Literature Review

With our institutional background outlined, we turn now to a review of current academic research and
price determination literature in order to begin to develop a workable model to explain the effects of how
increased costs for Russian energy firms may affect gasoline prices for heavily dependent European
nations. By analyzing previous studies that evaluate price-determination in multi-country settings, I aim
to identify all requisite supply-side and demand-side inputs to inform my research. While there have been
many studies conducted on gasoline price determination, there has been limited previous research on the
interaction of gasoline price determination, European energy markets, and economic sanctions. Despite
this limitation, there have been five primary academic resources that I have utilized to inform my research
of this topic. For our price determination literature, we will reference U.S. Energy Information
Administration’s (EIA) reports. The EIA is the premier global source for international and domestic
energy information. Therefore, we will first analyze the academic research and explain how it may inform
a particular model before shifting to a review of EIA literature for similar model determination aims.
a. Academic Research
i. Austrian Institute of Economic Research – Disrupted Trade Relations Between
the EU and Russia: The Potential Economic Consequences for the EU and
Switzerland
In June 2015, Dr. Elisabeth Cristen and Dr. Gerhard Streicher of the Austrian Institute of Economic
Research (WIFO) published the most important contribution for the expanding study of the economic
effects of 2014 Russian Sanctions on the European market. WIFO, founded by Friedrich Hayek and
Ludwig von Mises, is a globally respected think tank which also happens to be the largest research
institute for economics in Austria. Cristen and Streicher found, via using the most recent data available to
them in December 2014, that there were sizeable effects of the Russian Sanctions upon the European
market. These effects amounted to a total value added of €34 billion in short-run loss trade and €92
billion in long-run lost trade. These costs were a summation of lost exports, tourism, and a number of
other factors. These other factors include the worsening of EU-Russia diplomatic relations, the recession
of the Russian economy, and boycotts by non-sanctioned Russian companies (Cristen and Streicher 1).
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Cristen and Streicher explain that it is difficult to separate these factors from one another to truly identify
the effect of the sanctions implemented by the EU, U.S., and Canada and the corresponding countersanctions enacted by the Russian Federation. In order to attempt to isolate these effects, Cristen and
Streicher used a multi variate model including the 27 EU countries, Russia, and Switzerland (Cristen and
Streicher 1). Using this model, they found the following results:
“…the observed decline in exports and tourism expenditures of € 44 billion was estimated to have an
impact on the economies of the EU 27 plus Switzerland of € 34 billion in value added in the short run,
with employment effects of almost 0.9 million people. Switching to a longer-term view (additionally
taking into account an income induced reduction in household consumption), the economic effects
increase up to 2.2 million jobs (around 1 percent of total employment) and € 92 billion (0.8 percent of
total value added), respectively.” (Cristen and Streicher 1)
Cristen and Streicher did not specifically focus on energy markets, but on the EU economy holistically.
They also did not seem to consider the possibility that affected countries may shift their focus to nonaffected markets via expansion to offset the costs of loss revenue in Russia. Furthermore, Cristen and
Streicher discovered that geographical proximity to Russia correlated with higher effects of sanctionsrelated losses (Cristen and Streicher 3). I have accounted for geographical proximity in my model and
difference-in-differences group determination through collecting data for countries that are geographically
close to Russia.
Building upon Cristen and Streicher’s work, we can see that there is a relationship between geographical
proximity to Russia and the negative effects of sanctions. Like the WIFO study, it is challenging to
account for substitution effects for European nations within energy markets as supply chains are dynamic
institutions and the reorganization of these supply chains could affect my ability to measure the true effect
of sanctions upon specific national markets. We should expect to see the most sizeable price impacts of
the 2014 Russian Sanctions in nations located geographically close to Russia, such as Estonia, Finland,
and Poland, among others. I will utilize Cristen and Streicher’s example of using a multi-country model
11

so as to account for country-specific effects. This can be accomplished via the use of country-specific
dummy variables. Finally, it is important to note the large cost of loss trade determined by Cristen and
Streicher. At a cost of €34 billion in short-run loss trade and €92 billion in long-run loss trade for the EU,
these figures only further contribute to the importance of this study (Cristen and Streicher 1). As the
WIFO study attempted to quantify the cost of loss trade for all markets, it is possible that these costs
could depress demand for petrol markets as well, and therefore affect my results. This effect has been
considered for my model. As stated, the costs of sanctions-related loss trade are sizeable. The continued
study of this topic is imperative as the Western world continues to grapple with the consequences of their
foreign policy.
ii. Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and Economic Studies – Oil Price PassThrough in Curaçao
This 2007 Sir Arthur Lewis Institute academic research paper on how the price of oil is passed through to
end users was also extremely informative for this research. Pau, Henriquez, and Carolina analyzed how
oil price shocks affected gasoline prices for Curaçao. This study was conducted by analyzing rising oil
prices during 2005. Pau and his associates discovered that higher crude oil prices resulted in higher
inflation, dependent upon labor market flexibility and the ability of producers to pass on costs to end
users. Similarly, they found that in competitive market economies, there is strong evidence to suggest full
and automatic pass-through of international oil price shifts on local oil prices (Pau, et al. 82). Full passthrough contributes to better price signals. As such pass-though could result in volatile price swings,
many nations engage in retail price smoothing, due to the importance of oil products to economies (Pau,
et al. 82-83). As consumers prefer smoother prices, there tends to be a one quarter lag in observing the
effect of oil volatility on gasoline prices. (Pau, et al. 93).
The findings of Pau, Henriquez, and Carolina inform my research by suggesting that I add in a one
quarter, or three month, time lag into my analysis. This paper also supports my thoughts that oil prices
will be passed through to end users at a significant level, whether totally or partially. It will be important
to consider if European economies use similar price smoothing techniques like Curaçao. Due to the scope
12

of this paper and the vulnerability of oil markets in European economies to Russian supply, we will
utilize a time lag, but will investigate specific smoothing policies in further research.
iii. Washington University & INSEAD - An Econometric Model of Location and
Pricing in the Gasoline Market
Tat Y. Chan and P.B. Seetharaman of the Olin Business School at Washington University of St. Louis
and V. Padmanabhan of INSEAD-Singapore conducted a study published on July 26th, 2006 analyzing
how location and pricing affects the Singapore petrol market. More specifically, via an econometric
model accounting for the geography of gasoline retailers and the relative pricing between competitors,
Chan, Seetharaman and Padmanabhan were able to infer attributes of gasoline demand for Singaporean
consumers. Their model incorporated population, median income, quantity of cars, airport proximity,
downtown proximity, and highway proximity (Chan, et al. 2). The authors found that retail margins for
gasoline retailers settled around 21%. Also discovered was that consumers would travel up to a mile in
order to save 3 cents/liter. Furthermore, gasoline retailers are negatively influenced by the price of
gasoline (Chan, et al. 2). Chan, Seetharaman, and Padmanabhan continue to reiterate the importance of
these findings for policy makers when deliberating on gasoline and oil policy.
This joint Washington University and INSEAD study also reemphasized the importance of geography in
explaining gasoline price changes. As I will account for country-level retail costs with fixed effects, I can
set aside this part of Chan, Seetharaman, and Padmanabhan’s model. This study also provides further
evidence for the importance of including some form of a crude oil variable in my model. I will
incorporate crude oil prices as a proportional variable to account for crude oil with respect to countrylevel unleaded and diesel gasoline prices.
iv. University of California Los Angeles & Georgetown University - The Politics of
Petroleum Prices: A New Global Dataset
This joint UCLA-Georgetown study attempts to address the fact that retail gasoline prices are not
commonly understood. In the past, it has been difficult to obtain country-level data on fuel prices. Ross,
Hazlett, and Mahdavi therefore collected monthly pricing data from 157 countries to inform better pricing

13

policies (Ross, et al. 1). They found two policy trends as a result: 1) a reduction in ad valorem gasoline
taxes and that most costs are passed on to consumers and 2) that the only countries with significant oil
subsidies are oil exporters. Ad valorem taxes in this case refer to taxes as a percentage of the benchmark
crude (Ross, et al. 1). Additionally, it is noteworthy that as a function of pricing policy, European
countries and countries that were a part of the former Soviet Union held the highest prices (Ross, et al.
21).
The pricing data collected by Ross, Hazlett, and Mahdavi provides evidence for the importance of
obtaining country-level pricing data. This study provides support for my use of country-level gasoline and
diesel prices from the European Commission’s Weekly Oil Bulletin. Also, this research provides evidence
that the effects of the 2014 Russian Sanctions will be passed onto end users, as Ross, Hazlett, and
Mahdavi found that most costs are passed on to consumers (Ross, et al. 1). As this study was focused on
the development of a price dataset for more informed pricing policy, it is hard to pull further information
to inform my model development. Even still, there is evidence here that should be considered.
v. KIEL Institute for the World Economy - Friendly Fire: The Trade Impact of the
Russia Sanctions and Counter-Sanctions
Finally, one of the most influential pieces for this research was the 2016 KIEL Institute for the World
Economy working paper “Friendly Fire: The Trade Impact of the Russia Sanctions and CounterSanctions.” In this paper Mattheiu Crozet and Julian Hinz investigated the costs incurred by the
sanctioning EU countries resulting from the implementation of sanctions upon Russia. Crozet and Hinz
found that the majority of loss trade costs borne by the EU were not the result of the Russian Federation’s
counter sanctions on agricultural. This implies that the costs of loss trade are primarily caused by the
EU’s own sanctions upon Russian energy, finance, and defense sectors (Crozet and Hinz 2). Using French
customs data, they discovered that the disruption in trade finance services was found to be one of the most
significant causes of the total cost of loss trade (Crozet and Hinz 2). Crozet and Hinz utilized the
following difference-in-differences found on pg. 25 to test for the effects of the 2014 Russian Sanctions:
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Crozet and Hinz explain that 𝛳𝑖𝑡𝑘 represents time fixed effects, 𝛳𝑖𝑑𝑘 represents firm*product*destination
fixed effect, 𝛳𝑑𝑘𝑡 represents destination*product*time fixed effect, and 𝐵𝑆𝑜𝑑𝑡 represents the impact of
sanctions with time-varying fixed effects (Crozet and Hinz 25). Ideally, they hoped to compare the trend
in French exports to Russia with exports from a nation that is not participating in Russian economic
sanctions. The ideal data set would be set at the monthly level, however Crozet and Hinz found this to be
unfeasible, and therefore used micro level trade data from France, their test country (Crozet and Hinz 25).
A final notable point of “Friendly Fire: The Trade Impact of the Russia Sanctions and Counter-Sanctions”
was that Crozet and Hinz found that French firms directly exposed to the effects of Russian Sanctions
were not easily able to realign their supply chains towards other non-Russian customers (Crozet and Hinz
47). They use the term “trade diversion” as another way to describe a substitution effect. The following
paragraph highlights these findings:
“Finally, we investigate whether affected French exporters diverted their sales to other
markets after being hit with restrictions to the Russian market. Firms that were directly
exposed to Russian counter-sanctions, i.e., previously exported certain agricultural or food
products later targeted by counter-sanctions by the Russian Federation, were not able to
recover their loss by expanding sales to new or existing destinations aside from Russia.
These firms that were not directly hit by counter-sanctions, i.e., those previously exporting
to the Russian Federation, did serve more markets afterwards, but did not increase flows
to existing partner countries. Overall, trade diversion effects remain insignificant or very
small in magnitude.” (Crozet and Hinz 47)
The findings of Crozet and Hinz are extremely useful in determining my own model specification. Unlike
Crozet and Hinz, I have been able to collect useful monthly level data from multiple countries that have
both participated in EU sanctions and yet differ in exposure to the Russian energy supply chain. We will
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utilize a similar approach by using a difference-in-differences approach. Also important to note are Crozet
and Hinz’s findings of a lack of trade diversion in the European agricultural market (Crozet and Hinz 47).
While I cannot confidently say that this lack of substitution will occur in oil markets, due to their global
nature, it is still worthy of consideration. If I am unable to reject my null hypothesis, the existence of a
substitution effect resulting from supply chain realignments may very well be possible. Two final points
of consideration gathered from this study include the use of fixed effects and the existence of negative
effects to EU economies resulting from their own trade sanctions. These contribute to my confidence in
the method, purpose, and form of this research. However, as Crozet and Hinz focused their work on
French agricultural firms, we find that there is a continued need for further detail and research in each
sanctioned sector. I will pursue this here within the energy sector through this study of gasoline and diesel
prices.
vi. Literature Summation
From our review of these five studies, I have established several important considerations for my analysis.
-

-

-

WIFO
o Geographical proximity magnifies the effect of sanctions.
o Fixed effects should be used to account for country-specific factors.
Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and Economic Studies
o Market economies significantly pass through crude oil costs to end users.
o Oftentimes crude oil price volatility experiences a three-month lag before affecting end
user gasoline prices.
Washington University & INSEAD
o Geography affects pricing.
o A variable for the price of crude oil should be incorporated into any model for gasoline
price determination.
o Gasoline demand is inelastic.
University of California Los Angeles & Georgetown University
o Data should be designated at the country level where possible.
o Most costs are passed onto end users.
KIEL Institute for the World Economy
o A difference-in-differences approach is particularly suited for analyzing the effects of the
2014 Russian Sanctions on European economies.
o It is important to be mindful of possible substitution effects.
o Again, fixed effects can appropriately account for country-specific factors.
o EU sanctions have caused significant negative effects for European economies.
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b. EIA Price Determination Literature
i. Price Structure Overview
I will now provide a more in-depth review of how the price of gasoline is determined so as to complement
my academic research. By determining other supply and demand factors that affect oil prices, we will be
able to more clearly understand how a supply price shock could affect European nations’ gasoline prices.
If there are significant price determinants not related to crude oil, then these determinants would need to
be accounted for in determining the effect of the 2014 Russian Sanctions on European gasoline markets.
To determine price inputs, I will be referencing the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s October
2014 report “What Drives U.S. Gasoline Prices?” While this report is targeted towards explaining the
American gasoline market, the information it provides is valuable as a starting point in understanding
European gasoline markets. To ease concerns about the applicability of this report, the EIA has found that
due to gasoline and crude oil existing as globally traded commodities, prices and price shifts are highly
correlated across global spot markets (EIA Sept. 2016).
As described by the EIA, the price of American gasoline is determined by four supply aspects:
1)
2)
3)
4)

The price of crude oil
Refining costs and profit margins
Retail and distributional costs and profit margins
Taxes

A visual representation (Fig. 1) of how each of these price inputs affects the final price of U.S. gasoline is
provided below:
Figure 1 - EIA Gasoline Price Source Percentage Contributions

Source: EIA 2014
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We will address each of these price determinants in turn.
ii. Crude Oil
The price of crude oil is the single largest driver of gasoline prices. American crude oil is determined by
the spot price of the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) blend, while European oil is determined by the Brent
crude spot price (EIA Sept. 2016). As these originate in the United States and European Union
respectively, this is logical. The price of WTI and Brent are highly correlated as demonstrated by Figure
2:
Figure 2 – WTI-Brent Price Correlation

Source: EIA Sept. 2016

From their analysis, the EIA has determined that the Brent price is the main driver of spot markets,
instead of WTI. Therefore, Brent is the main determinant of U.S. gasoline prices (EIA Sept. 2016). This
fact only underscores the importance of understanding the price of Brent as an important consideration for
European gasoline prices and my study too.
In the past five years, the price of Brent has moved violently from a high of $125.81 in early 2012 to a
low of $28.94 only four years later in January 2016. Recently, Brent has been trading between $50 - $60
(Bloomberg 2016). Due to this extreme volatility, I expect to see similar movements in gasoline prices
after a lag (EIA Sept. 2016, Pau, et al. 93). Global oil prices have felt strong downward pressure in recent
times due to the emergence of a supply glut in the oil market due to four factors: 1) The strong U.S.
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dollar, 2) the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries’ (OPEC) unwillingness to curb
production, 3) an oversupply of global crude oil, and 4) declining global demand (Tarver 2015). As local
gasoline prices are reflective of fluctuations in the international price of crude oil, Brent especially, I
expect to see declines in the average monthly price of gasoline for my test and control groups resulting
from global supply increases and global demand decreases. It will be important that I control for the Brent
price so as to properly identify any positive price effect of the 2014 Russian Sanctions upon local
European unleaded and diesel gasoline prices resulting from increases in costs for Russian energy firms.
Therefore, due to the extreme explanatory power of the price of crude oil (Brent), it will be important to
include this in my model. As Figure 1 shows, the price of crude oil made up 47% and 43% of the price of
unleaded and diesel gasoline the American consumer paid for at the pump in September 2016 (EIA 2014).
Therefore, it is imperative that my model incorporates the average monthly price of Brent to account for
this for the European consumer. However, as this price explains such a high level of explanatory power, I
will divide the average monthly price of Brent crude by the average monthly country-level price of
gasoline and diesel. By taking this approach, I will develop a proportional variable that is not so powerful
as to explain away the variability of gasoline prices. If I did not do this, it is likely that a pure Brent crude
variable would explain all fluctuation in average monthly gasoline prices. As my true objective is to
determine the effect of the 2014 Russian sanctions on each countries’ average monthly gasoline and
diesel prices, not the effect of crude oil on gasoline prices, this is a necessary step. I will collect the
average monthly price of Brent crude from the EIA’s website.
iii. Refining Costs & Profit Margins
Refining costs and their respective profit margins vary by country and region. This is the result of the
different blends needed in each country and the allowed amount of pollution. Seasonal blends also affect
refining costs due to the variety of ingredients associated with winter and summer blends (EIA Feb.
2016). Total EU refining capacity stands today at 15 million b/d, or around 16% of total global capacity
(European Commission 2010). It is important to note that the quantity of refineries in Europe and their
respective refining capacities has remained constant in recent years. Table 1 illustrates the quantity of
19

refineries in each EU country remaining from Table 3 and their respective crude oil capacity as recorded
in 2010 by the European Commission’s working paper On Refining and The Supply of Petroleum
Products in the EU.
Table 1 – Sample Nations’ Refining Capacities
Nation

Refinery Quantity

Total Refining Crude Capacity (kt/Year)

Total Refining Crude Capacity (b/d)

Slovakia
Poland

1

6,004,111

120,000

2

24,666,891

493,000

Estonia

0

-

-

Lithuania

1

9,506,510

190,000

Hungary

1

8,055,516

161,000

Bulgaria

1

8,806,030

176,000

Finland

2

12,783,752

255,500

Czech
Republic
Croatia

3

9,606,577

192,000

0

-

-

Latvia

0

-

-

Romania

6

21,388,497

427,525

Italy

16

111,333,164

2,225,600

Austria

1

10,006,852

200,000

Germany

13

121,743,365

2,433,200

Source: European Commission 2010

For my study, I will not include a variable for refining costs and refining profit margins. As the quantity
of refineries has remained constant over the last ten years, a variable for this determinant will not yield
any additional explanatory power. For the demand side factors that affect refining profit margins, I aim to
account for those with additional demand-side variables that will be explained later. I can use fixed
effects to account for this variable as well, in order to ensure that it is not entirely neglected.
iv. Retail and Distributional Costs & Profit Margins
The third price determinant for retail unleaded and diesel gasoline prices is distribution and retail costs.
These costs originate from the transportation of refined products to local areas of consumption. From the
refinery, gasoline is typically delivered by a tanker truck to a gasoline station. Owners of retail outlets can
vary. Sometimes they are owned by the upstream refineries, other times they are owned by large chains or
independent businesses. Due to the locality of these businesses, they are subject to local market factors
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and conditions as well, and individual business strategies. Examples of local market factors include
competition, wage rates, traffic patterns, and other final market characteristics and pressures (EIA Feb.
2016). However, the total effect on prices from this area remains between 13% - 18%, depending on if the
gasoline sold is unleaded or diesel fuel (EIA 2014).
I will not include a variable for retail and distributional costs and their respective profit margins. Due to
the diversity of this within each country and the data available, it is possible that these rates could be time
variant, but the level of detail that this would require is outside the feasibility of this study. In place of a
variable counting the quantity of retail outlets or the wage rates available, I will once again use fixed
effects to account for all country-specific characteristics.
v. Taxes
Finally, taxes affect gasoline prices. Taxes applied to gasoline purchases in Europe are value-added taxes,
often shortened to VAT (European Commission Oil Bulletin 2017). One of the key differences between
the American and European gasoline markets is the difference in tax levels. European gasoline is
generally taxed at higher rates than American gasoline. The difference in taxes is a key consideration as
we determine the applicability of the EIA report to European markets. Figure 3 provides a visual
representation of the difference between European and American gasoline taxation.
Figure 3 - European-U.S. Tax as a Percentage of Total Gasoline Price

Source: European Commission 2010
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Despite the presence of significant taxes placed upon gasoline consumers in the EU, nominal VAT rates
have remained remarkably constant over the last ten years, despite the volatility of the oil market. For all
current EU countries, VAT rates for gasoline have changed by 3% or less since 2007. Many EU countries
have not altered their gasoline VAT rate at all (European Commission Oil Bulletin 2017).
For the final EIA price determinant, I will not account for individual countries’ gasoline and diesel tax
rates. As nation-specific tax rates have remained consistent in the last decade, their lack of variability
provides little explanatory power for my model. Due to the lack of change in rates, I will use countrylevel fixed effects to account for this possible variable as well. The use of fixed effects will ensure that the
individuality of each nations’ tax rates is considered, while allowing us to developing a model that will be
directed towards explaining the effect of the 2014 Russian Sanctions on EU energy markets.
c. Gasoline Price Determination Summation
Each of these four EIA requirements incorporates demand and supply side pressures into the costs
producers contribute to gasoline. Except for the proportional lagged Brent crude oil variable, these other
EIA determinants are unchanging and will be accounted for by fixed effects, as noted above. This use of
fixed effects is inspired by WIFO’s Cristen and Streicher and KIEL’s Crozet and Hinz. Also from the
work of these studies, I will use a difference-in-differences approach and include countries in my sample
that are geographically close to Russia and likely to experience strong loss trade from the 2014 Russian
Sanctions (Cristen and Streicher 3, Crozet and Hinz 25). As we continue to develop our model, I will be
sure to include a demand side variable that will be further explained in a following section.

IV.

Russo-European Energy Relationships

Moving on from our literature review now, we must explore: 1) the Russian energy sector, 2) the EU’s
reliance on Russian crude oil, 3) the identification of European nations particularly dependent on Russian
oil imports, and 4) the decision to focus on gasoline specifically. By understanding these four topics, we
may better understand how EU sanctions of Rosneft, Transneft, and Gazprom Neft may affect European
gasoline prices.
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a. How is the Russian Energy Sector structured?
The Russian Federation is a critical member of international oil markets. Russia produces the third largest
quantity of crude oil in the world at 12.4% (Statista 2015). Led by Rosneft, Lukoil, Surgutneftegaz, and
Gazprom, the energy sector is especially important for the vitality of the Russian economy. in 2014, The
energy industry totaled approximately 67% of total Russian export value. More specifically, Russian total
export value is led by crude petroleum (35%), refined petroleum (20%), and petroleum gas (8%) (OEC
2017). Due the extreme correlation of a healthy energy sector to the overall health of the Russian
economy, I have chosen the sanctioned energy sector as the focus of my analysis. Despite this choice,
further analysis of the effects of the 2014 Russian Sanctions upon agricultural, defense, and finance
markets is needed and will be considered in the future. Returning to Rosneft, Lukoil, Surgutneftegaz, and
Gazprom, these firms contribute 39%, 16%, 12%, and 10% of total oil production in Russia, respectively
(EIA 2017). The following table displays a breakdown of Russian oil production.
Table 2 - Russian Oil Production by Company (2014)

Source: EIA 2017
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Another critical firm within this market is Transneft, which holds a near monopoly over the Russian
pipeline system (EIA 2017). These companies are either directly state-owned and controlled, or closely
tied to the Russian economy. Specifically, Igor I. Sechin, president of Rosneft, is one of the most
prominent individuals sanctioned (BBC 6). Through sanctioning Sechin and Rosneft, Transneft, and
Gazprom Neft, the EU has targeted some of the most important individuals and firms that contribute to
the health of the Russian energy sector. Furthermore, European sanctions specifically targeting these
companies no longer permit lucrative international partnerships. An effective example of business no
longer permitted is the partnership between ExxonMobil and Rosneft to explore the Russian arctic for oil
(Daiss 2016). The size and scope of these sanctions has effectively neutralized Western collaboration with
the firms critical to the Russian energy sector.
b. How Reliant is the EU on Russian Crude Oil?
Due to their size and their trade relationships with Europe, Rosneft, Transneft, and Gazprom Neft are all
critically linked to the EU energy market. First, the EU is extremely reliant on energy imports to satisfy
its energy needs. The EU imports 53% of the energy it consumes, leaving it susceptible to supply shocks.
Of crude oil imports, 30% originates from Russia (EIA 2017). In 2015, Rosneft, Transneft, and Gazprom
Neft, combined with all other Russian energy companies, made available a total of 7.6 million barrels per
day (b/d) of petroleum and other liquids for export. For Russia, 70% of these crude oil exports are
destined for Europe, with a large percentage sourced by Germany, the Netherlands, Belarus, and Poland
(EIA 2017). These percentages underscore the importance of this trade relationship.
While Russian companies are involved in all parts of the oil production process, they tend to focus on
crude oil as opposed to more downstream activities, like refining, as it is a higher margin business.
Refining is a lower margin activity, and can be completed anywhere. Refining tends to occur in the
country that expects to use the refined products, due to the low margins involved. Due to this, I believe
this aspect of Rosneft, Transneft, and Gazprom Neft’s business most clearly showcases how Russian
energy firms affect European end users. As Russia is at the beginning of the oil supply chain, and Europe
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and Russia are so mutually dependent on one another, it is logical to expect that any shock to the Russian
energy sector would cause cost ripples within the European crude oil and refined product markets as well.
c. Which European nations’ gasoline supply is most dependent upon Russian crude oil
imports?
i. Country Identification Overview
With the Russian energy dependency of the EU established, we now turn towards determining which EU
nations would be particularly affected by a shock to supply costs. We know from the WIFO and
Washington University & INSEAD studies that geography will heavily play into this, but can we be more
specific in identifying nations that may be the most sizably affected by the 2014 Russian Sanctions? To
determine which countries could be most locally affected by Russian oil costs increases and included in
the analysis, we will look at three different aspects of trade: tanker and vehicular transport, pipeline
transport, and Russian energy import percentages for EU nations. At this time it is important to note that
oil markets are global markets, and while I have done my best to isolate the locality of energy markets
and dependency, the global nature of these markets could ultimately affect this study and our country
identification.
ii. Tanker & Vehicular Transportation
Most imported European oil is brought by tankers and vehicles. At 80% of total oil transportation, this is
the main way oil is brought into Europe. Twenty percent of European oil is sourced through a pipeline
(Bjørnmose, et al. 2009). Two Russian ports dominate the nation’s oil export market – Primorsk and
Novorossiysk. Primorsk, which is located near St. Petersburg, Russia on the Leningrad Oblast, is Russia’s
largest oil transportation port. It has a capacity of 1.3 million b/d which is loaded onto tankers and
transported. Novorossiysk, situated on the Black Sea, has a loading capacity of over 1 million b/d (EIA
2017). Based upon geography, it is logical to assume that the majority of oil transported through Primorsk
finds its way to European nations. The final destination of oil passing through Novorossiysk is vaguer,
and while we could hypothesize that this oil is primarily destined for Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and
other close-by nations, I cannot confirm this, and so will disregard the importance of this port for the sake
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of this study. It is not practical to analyze all tanker and vehicular transportation patterns from the last
decade to determine specifically which nations are disproportionately reliant upon Russian crude oil.
Therefore, I do not find this to be an effective measurement for determining which countries may bear the
weight of unintentional effects of the 2014 Russian Sanctions.

iii. Pipeline Transportation
Regarding pipelines, there are two only two pipelines that bring oil to be refined into gasoline into the EU
– the Druzhba and Norpipe (Bjørnmose, et al. 2009). The Druzhba pipeline, which begins in Southeastern Russia, and is operated by Transneft, is the longest pipeline in the world. It has two arms. The
northern branch runs through and sources refineries in Belarus, Poland, Germany, and the Baltic
countries. The southern branch crosses and feeds refineries in Ukraine, Slovakia, Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Croatia (Bjørnmose, et al. 2009). The Norpipe pipeline originates in Norway and concludes
in the United Kingdom. It is owned by the Norwegian state-run firm Statoil. It is 354 kilometers long and
utilizes 40 Mtons per year of oil (Bjørnmose, et al. 2009). In contrast, the Druzhba pipeline, which is
approximately 4,000 km long, has a capacity between 85-100 Mtons, and transports about 65-70 Mtons
per year (Bjørnmose, et al. 2009). These pipelines are shown in Figure 4:
Figure 4 – Druzhba & Norpipe Pipeline Map
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Source: Bjørnmose, et al. 2009

The longer pipeline originating in Russia is the Druzhba and the shorter pipeline originating in the North
Sea is the Norpipe. These pipelines are connected to a myriad of smaller more regional pipelines, making
the final destination of transported oil extremely unclear. Like tanker and vehicular transport, due to the
limitations of this study and the lack of clarity regarding the final destination of the transported oil, I have
not found this to be a practical measurement for determining which countries may bear the weight of
unintentional effects of the 2014 Russian Sanctions. While only 20% of European oil is transported via
pipeline, this is still a large percentage, and will therefore be considered for incorporation in further work
on this topic and in model specification.
iv. Import Percentages
Figure 5 - Russian Oil Exports Destination Distribution

Source: EIA 2017

As we continue to determine which countries would bear the weight of an increase in Russian oil supply
costs, it is important to note the trade relationships of specific EU countries to Russia. The preceding
graphic (Fig. 5) illustrates the destination of Russian oil exports. I have found this method to be clearer
than my analysis of tanker and vehicular transport or pipeline transport in understanding which European
nations would be most affected by an increase in the supply costs of Russian oil. By understanding
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historically which countries have relied disproportionately on importing Russian crude oil, we may be
able to develop a framework which allows us to identify which nations we should expect to bear any
unintentional costs of Russian Sanctions.
Table 3 details the percentage of oil imported by EU countries from Russia, total import value from all
countries, and import value from Russia specifically. This information is sourced from 2014 data from
MIT’s Observatory of Economic Complexity.
Table 3 - European Oil Import Percentages by Country (2014)
Nation

EU Membership

Import
Percentage
from Russia

Import Value from
Russia (Billions)

Import Value
from Russia
(Millions)

100%

Total Import Oil
Value from All
Countries
(Billions)
7.75

Belarus

No

7.75

7,750

Slovakia

Yes

98%

3.6

3.53

3,528

Poland

Yes

93%

14.8

13.76

13,764

Estonia

Yes

93%

0.7

0.65

651

Lithuania

Yes

90%

5.16

4.64

4,644

Hungary

Yes

87%

4.38

3.81

3,811

Ukraine

No

87%

0.234

0.20

204

Bulgaria

Yes

82%

3.21

2.63

2,632

Finland

Yes

72%

8.04

5.79

5,789

Czech
Republic
Croatia

Yes

59%

4.63

2.73

2,732

Yes

57%

1.48

0.84

844

Netherlands

Yes

35%

66.9

23.42

23,415

Latvia

Yes

33%

0.106

0.03

35

Romania

Yes

29%

4.43

1.28

1,285

Germany

Yes

28%

53.5

14.98

14,980

Italy

Yes

18%

38

6.84

6,840

Denmark

Yes

10%

2.82

0.28

282

Norway

No

10%

0.865

0.09

87

Austria

Yes

7%

5.98

0.41

407

France

Yes

7%

35.4

2.34

2,336

Belgium

Yes

5%

23.3

1.14

1,142

Source: OEC 2017

Based upon Table 3 and the goal of this study, I will disregard countries that do not possess EU
membership (Belarus, Ukraine, and Norway). Based upon the preceding description of the structure of the
oil supply chain and with this information, I expect Slovakia, Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Hungary,
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Bulgaria, Finland, Czech Republic, and Croatia to be most vulnerable to oil supply costs shocks. This
determination has been made due to each of these countries dependence upon Russian imports registering
above 50% and the quantity of oil imported. In further iterations of this project, I plan to experiment with
lowering the 50% rate, and experimenting with different country groupings in order to further answer my
research question. Holding all things constant as best I can, I expect any effect of the 2014 Russian
Sanctions on gasoline prices to be most easily identifiable in nations 50% or more reliant on Russian
crude oil imports. Conversely, I would expect the effect of 2014 Russian Sanctions to be smaller as
nations decrease in reliance on Russia for their oil needs. Therefore, progressing with the 50% rate, I have
selected these nine countries to form my test group for this analysis. For my test group, I have constructed
a five-country sample of Latvia, Romania, Germany, Italy, and Austria. These countries, while potentially
affected by the 2014 Russian Sanctions, are suited to be controls as they are not as highly reliant upon
Russian crude oil imports based upon the Observatory of Economic Complexity’s 2014 data. I find this
method of import percentage analysis to be the most effective measure of understanding which EU
nations may bear the weight of the 2014 Russian Sanctions through increased unleaded and diesel
gasoline prices.
d. Why Gasoline?
Within the energy market, crude oil (crude petroleum), minerals, or refined petroleum products can be
studied. I have chosen to focus on gasoline for this study as it is the refined oil product that is almost
assuredly a part of the lives of all citizens of the nations affected by sanctions and countersanctions.
As was explained in my Literature Review, the cost of crude oil is the main price determinant for the
price of gasoline end consumers see at the pump (EIA 2014). Again, it is logical to expect that any
increase in costs experienced by Rosneft, Transneft, and Gazprom Neft will be passed on to end users in
countries that are reliant on Russian energy imports (Pau, et al. 93). Crude petroleum is not ideal for
further analysis due to the multitude of global factors that affect prices. Minerals, although important for
many industries, represent a small proportion of Russian exports, and are therefore not desirable for this
study. Therefore, refined petroleum products are left. As stated, gasoline is a refined product used by most
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people daily. Of gasoline products, this paper will focus on unleaded gasoline and diesel gasoline. It is
typical in European markets for unleaded and diesel gasolines to be designated by their octane ratings –
RON 95 (unleaded) and RON 98 (diesel) (European Commission Oil Bulletin 2017). Additionally,
gasoline prices are subject to many more local factors than crude oil prices, and are easier to collect at a
national level in order to determine price discrepancies. This information corresponds with my findings
from the reviewed UCLA-Georgetown study (Ross, et al. 1).

V.

Model Specification & Data Description

To build our final model, it is important we recall what how our research this far has influenced my
model. From WIFO’s Cristen and Streicher and KIEL’s Crozet and Hinz, I will use fixed effects. Chan,
Seetharaman, and Padmanabhan further affirmed the importance of inserting some form of a crude oil
variable in my model. Drawing from Pau and others at the Sir Arthur Lewis Institute, I will build a threemonth lag into our crude oil variable. From our review of EIA price determinants, I will utilize the
previously stated fixed effects to account for refining costs and profit margins, retail and distributional
costs and profit margins, taxes, and other time invariant country-specific factors. Also, our EIA research
further emphasized the need to account for the explanatory power of crude oil prices. Finally, Crozet and
Hinz informed us of the benefits of using a difference-in-differences analysis for analyzing the effect of
the 2014 Russian Sanctions on European markets. To account for all other demand-side pressures, I will
utilize GDP per Capita in my model.
From here, I will first explain my dataset. Second, I will provide a restatement of the justification of my
difference-in-differences groups. Third, I will explain my model and the benefits and drawbacks of this
particular approach. I will conclude this section with a statement of my formal research question and
hypotheses.
a. Data Description
I will use the European Commission’s Weekly Oil Bulletin as my base data set. This data set contains the
average weekly gasoline and diesel price for 1000 liters for all EU countries from January 2008 –
December 2015. To have a consistent time period, I will average the weekly prices for each country into
30

an average monthly price. Additionally, I have converted all prices to USD at the average monthly
EUR/USD rate for each appropriate time period. Using these EUR/USD foreign exchange rates also
accounts for macro-economic supply and demand pressures. To complement the European Commission’s
Weekly Oil Bulletin, I have sourced the average monthly price of Brent crude from the EIA and the
average annual GDP Per Capita for each sample nation from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators dataset.
b. Difference-In-Differences Groups
A difference-in-differences approach relies heavily on establishing the correct test and control group, so it
is imperative that we align our test nations to the correct groups. As stated earlier, my test group will be
EU countries that are 50% or more reliant on Russia for their supply of crude oil. My control group will
be EU countries that are geographically similar but who do not possess such a large reliance on Russian
oil, either due to internal production or a diversified supplier base. My test group will contain data for 9
countries. My control group will contain data for 5 countries. Figure 6 displays my test and control
groups.
Figure 6 – Difference-in-Differences Country Group Map
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With our groups established, I have constructed a working model which I believe will be able to explain
any price increases of unleaded and diesel gasoline prices for my test group resulting increased costs of
Rosneft, Transneft, and Gazprom Neft due to the 2014 Russian Sanctions.
c. Formal Model
RON 95 (Unleaded Gasoline) Model:
𝑌𝑅𝑂𝑁95𝑖𝑡 = ß0 + ß1𝑅𝑂𝑁95𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

𝑖,𝑡−3

+ ß2𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 + ß3 𝐷𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + ß4 𝐷𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑆𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡
𝑖𝑡

+ ß5 𝐷𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡∗𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑆𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 + ß𝐹𝐸 + €𝑖𝑡
RON 98 (Diesel Gasoline) Model:
𝑌𝑅𝑂𝑁98𝑖𝑡 = ß0 + ß1𝑅𝑂𝑁98𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

𝑖,𝑡−3

+ ß2𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 + ß3 𝐷𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + ß4 𝐷𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑆𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡
𝑖𝑡

+ ß5 𝐷𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡∗𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑆𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 + ß𝐹𝐸 + €𝑖𝑡
Explanatory Variables:
1) 𝑌𝑅𝑂𝑁95𝑖𝑡 & 𝑌𝑅𝑂𝑁98𝑖𝑡 : The average monthly price of unleaded and diesel gasoline per country from
January 2008 – December 2015, respectively. This variable is measured in USD.
2) ß0 : The constant term.
3) ß1𝑅𝑂𝑁95𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

𝑖,𝑡−3

& ß1𝑅𝑂𝑁98𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

𝑖,𝑡−3

: Proportional variables dividing the average monthly

price of unleaded and diesel gasoline (1000 liters) by the average monthly price of Brent crude.
The average monthly price of unleaded and diesel gasoline was collected from the European
Commission’s Weekly Oil Bulletin. The average monthly price of Brent crude was collected from
the EIA’s databank and recorded in USD. This includes a three-month lag to account for the time
that passes until oil prices may affect local gasoline prices. This variable is measured in USD.
4) ß2𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 : A GDP per capita variable to capture the relative market demand of each nation.
𝑖𝑡

This information was collected annually from 2008 – 2015 from the World Bank. This variable
was recorded in USD.
5) ß3 𝐷𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 : A dummy variable to identify nations reliant on Russian oil imports above 50%.
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6) ß4 𝐷𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑆𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 : A dummy variable to represent time periods after the final implantation of EU
sanctions in September 2014.
7) ß5 𝐷𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡∗𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑆𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 : A dummy variable to identify the interaction effect between
nations reliant on Russian oil imports above 50% and after the implementation of Russian
Sanctions in September 2014.
8) ß𝐹𝐸 : Fixed effects used for all countries in my data set to account for all country-specific
characteristics such as tax rates, quantity of refineries, driving culture, and retail market qualities.
9) €𝑖𝑡 : My error term. My error term will be clustered by country.
The proportional variables – the ratio of gasoline to crude oil prices – will capture deviations in prices
based on sanctions. I will use robust standard errors clustered by country. Additionally, the included GDP
per capita variable accounts for a variety of population and income data I believe to provide additional
explanatory power. As stated above, all data has been collected or set at a monthly time interval,
beginning in January 2008 and ending in December 2015. Ideally, my model would possess data that is
measured at a smaller time setting than monthly. I would like to include more granular demand side data
and a variable that could more effectively account for oil shipped via tankers. I believe the inclusion of
these variables could possess additional explanatory power, however collecting such information is not
practical at this time. As I believe my model is the most feasible method of explaining price changes
related to the Russian Sanctions on energy markets, this model will be acceptable for the purposes of this
study.
d. Formal Research Question & Hypotheses
Research Question:
Did the 2014 EU sanctions on Russia for their involvement in the Crimean Annexation/Invasion have a
positive price effect on the average price of unleaded and diesel fuel for EU nations with 50% or more
dependence upon the Russian supply of crude oil imports?
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My hypotheses:
𝐻 0 : The 2014 Russian Sanctions had no price effect on the average monthly gasoline and diesel price for
EU nations 50% or more reliant on Russian crude oil imports.
𝐻1 : The 2014 Russian Sanctions had a price effect on the average monthly gasoline and diesel price for
EU nations 50% or more reliant on Russian crude oil imports.

VI.

Empirical Results
1. Econometric Output

After running both RON 95 (Unleaded Gasoline) and RON 98 (Diesel Gasoline) Models, I found
revealing results (Table 4). Both models showcased statistical significance at the 99% level, as shown by
the high F-statistics. Most importantly, my difference-in-differences indicator, or the Interaction Dummy,
was statistically insignificant. Due to this, I cannot reject my null hypothesis (𝐻 0 ). For this iteration of
this specific model, I have found no statistically significant price effect of the 2014 Russian Sanctions on
the average monthly unleaded and diesel gasoline price of EU nations 50% or more reliant upon Russian
crude oil imports. Important to consider the negative coefficient associated with my difference-indifferences indicator. This general downward trend could cloud any discernible sanction effect.
Table 4 – Consolidated Regression Output

Changes in Average Monthly RON 95 & RON 98 Prices for 14 EU Nation
Sample
1/2008-12/2015 (in US$)

Price Determinant
Crude Price Proportion
GDP Per Capita
Sanctions Time Dummy
Interaction Dummy (Test*Sanctions)
F-Statistic

RON 95 Model
4.97
0.037***
-144.570***
-1.331
25.88***

RON 98 Model
-2.167
0.049***
-146.306***
-27.07
34.71***

These results suggest that any increased costs experienced by Rosneft, Transneft, and Gazprom Neft
because of EU sanctions were not clearly passed onto EU consumers, as far as I can tell from my
difference-in-differences analysis. Neither did I find my crude price proportion variable to be statistically
significant. Interestingly enough, I found that GDP Per Capita and my Sanctions Time Dummy were both
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statistically significant at the 99% level for both models. Holding all other price determinants constant,
for a one USD increase in GDP Per Capita, the average monthly price of RON 95 and RON 98 increases
by .037 and .049 USD, respectively. Similarly, holding all other price determinants constant, for a time
period where the 2014 Russian Sanctions are enacted, the average monthly price of RON 95 and RON 98
decreases by 144.570 and 146.306 USD, respectively. Both models possessed a large explanatory power
of the variation of the average monthly price of unleaded and diesel gasoline with an 𝑅 2 of .3491 and
.4317 for RON 95 and RON 98 respectively.
After running these models, I ran an alternative set of models where I replaced the original dependent
variables, 𝑌𝑅𝑂𝑁95𝑖𝑡 and 𝑌𝑅𝑂𝑁98𝑖𝑡 , with price proportional variables, 𝑌

𝑅𝑂𝑁95
𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑑𝑒 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑡

𝑌

𝑅𝑂𝑁98
𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑑𝑒 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑡

and

, in order to see how my explanatory variables would explain changes in the ratio of

average unleaded and diesel monthly prices to Brent crude prices. This second set of models is as follows:
RON 95 (Unleaded Gasoline)/Brent Average Model:
𝑌

𝑅𝑂𝑁95
𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑑𝑒 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑡

= ß0 + ß1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 + ß2 𝐷𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + ß3 𝐷𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑆𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 +
𝑖𝑡

ß4 𝐷𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡∗𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑆𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 + ß𝐹𝐸 + €𝑖𝑡
RON 98 (Diesel Gasoline)/Brent Average Model:
𝑌

𝑅𝑂𝑁98
𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑑𝑒 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑡

= ß0 + ß1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 + ß2 𝐷𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + ß3 𝐷𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑆𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 +
𝑖𝑡

ß4 𝐷𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡∗𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑆𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 + ß𝐹𝐸 + €𝑖𝑡
After running the second models, I found similar results. There was still no statistical significance for my
difference-in-differences indicator for either RON 95/Brent Average or RON 98/Brent Average models.
This time however, my RON 95/Brent Average showcased a positive coefficient for the difference-indifferences indicator, while the RON 98/Brent Average coefficient remained negative. In contrast to the
difference-in-differences indicator, my Sanctions Time Dummy variable was found to be statistically
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significant at the 99% level for both updated models. GDP Per Capita was statistically significant at the
99% level for the updated RON 95 model, while being statistically insignificant for the updated RON 98
model.
2. Diagnostic Testing
After running my model and finding these results, I ran several diagnostic tests to check for robustness. I
was concerned with multicollinearity, heteroskedasticity, and autocorrelation.
a. Multicollinearity
Multicollinearity occurs when two or more explanatory variables are highly correlated. Due to
multicollinearity, my Treatment Group Dummy variable was dropped from my final regression output by
Stata. I checked the remaining variables for multicollinearity by calculating the variance inflation factor
(VIF) of each explanatory variable shown in my final regression output (Table 5).
Table 5 – Variance Inflation Test

Commonly held wisdom states that if the VIF factor for any explanatory variable is greater than 10, than
that explanatory variable showcases strong evidence of multicollinearity. However, as shown above, none
of my final explanatory variables showcased a VIF factor greater than 10. Multicollinearity is not present.
b. Heteroskedasticity
Heteroskedasticity occurs when the error term is not normally distributed. This can be remedied via the
use of robust standard errors and the use of fixed effects. I have incorporated fixed effects into my model
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and have clustered my standard errors at the country level. For further evidence of the normalness of my
standard errors please see Appendix Figures 1 and 2 for a kernel distribution of my errors.
c. Autocorrelation
Autocorrelation occurs when the elements of a series are correlated with previous terms of the same
series. Like heteroskedasticity, I have found evidence that my model is robust to autocorrelation via fixed
effects.

VII.

Implications & Further Considerations

1. Implications of Findings
Considering that my difference-in-differences variable was statistically insignificant for both of my
models, I cannot reject my null hypothesis (𝐻 0 ). What does this mean? Simply put, it means that I have
not found a statistically significant positive price relationship between the enactment of the 2014 Russian
Sanctions and average monthly unleaded and diesel gasoline prices for EU nations 50% or more reliant on
Russian crude oil imports. I have not found that the increased costs endured by Rosneft, Transneft, and
Gazprom Neft have been passed onto end users in Slovakia, Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Hungary,
Bulgaria, Finland, the Czech Republic, and Croatia. As general economic theory suggests, an increase in
the costs of a supplier should result in increases in price for demand-side users. However, I did not see
this.
This is an informative result. I was not able with the current data and methods to determine any
unintentional price effects of the 2014 Russian Sanctions for EU gasoline markets. This knowledge
should be accounted for in conversation among foreign policy leaders. Whether regarding the 2014
Ukrainian Revolution or some other international crisis, the applicability of this research remains if
sanctions are under consideration for an aggressing nation. If with further research, and my results
continue to be validated, then my results could give confidence to leaders to use international sanctions
where appropriate to deter expansionist actions without fear of significantly affecting domestic prices.
Similarly, it is important that sanctions are further analyzed to determine their legitimacy and
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appropriateness as productive policy instruments. If further credited, then this only increases the diversity
of policies with which leaders can respond with to prevent a conflict from escalating into a war.
2. Further Considerations
While I found that I was unable to reject my null hypothesis (𝐻 0 ), I want to note that the preceding
analysis is only the first iteration of research that will continue in the coming years. There are two realms
of possible influencers that could contribute to me experiencing a type II error in this iteration. Despite
my belief that I have included all necessary price factors, there is the possibility of model specification
error, which occurs when a model is not specified correctly. This can bias the coefficients of my
explanatory variables and skew my P-values. To attempt to determine the accuracy of my model
specification, I ran a link test on the RON 95 and RON 98 models. Neither my RON 95 nor my RON 98
model showcased signs of model specification error. Neither of my models had a “_hatsq” variable that
was statistically significant, leaving me unable to reject the assumption that the model was specified
correctly. Appendix Tables 4 and 5 provide more detailed output of these tests. Despite the results of this
test, I have identified two realms of possible influencers that could contribute to the possibility of a type II
error in this iteration. The first realm encapsulates a variety of shifting global factors while the second
realm considers the design of my empirical model. While I do not believe that these considerations could
have seriously biased my results, I plan to give these realms further thought in future iterations of this
research to ensure I do not fail to reject a false null.
a. Overview of Potentially Influential Global Factors
Within the global market, there are four factors that could have affected my results. The global nature of
oil markets, global crude oil supply increases, global crude oil demand decreases, and the appreciation of
the U.S. dollar could all skew my results. Three of these factors are supply-side influences, and one is a
demand-side influence.
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i. Global Nature of Oil Markets
Crude oil is a globally traded commodity, and is therefore subject to a variety of supply-side and demandside factors that can make it extremely difficult to evaluate the effect of international policy. Due to the
litany of these influences, it is challenging to isolate the effect of trade sanctions that affect only a few of
the players within energy markets. The price of Brent crude oil accounts for a variety of nations and their
respective markets, further diversifying and mitigating the effect of smaller shocks that only apply to a
limited quantity of countries. The Brent crude oil price quickly adjusts for shocks, furthering the difficulty
of analyzing smaller shifts to supply and demand. Although Russia is the third largest producer of crude
oil at 12.4%, there are other nations who have greater influence on the price of gasoline and crude oil
(Statista 2015). Additionally, 12.4% is a relatively small number once considered within the scope of the
entire global market.
ii. Increases in Global Supply
During the timeframe of my study, January 2008 – December 2015, there were a variety of other
important supply side developments that could have affected my findings. As stated in Petroleum Pricing
Determinants section, the Brent crude oil price has shifted from a high of $125.81 in early 2012 to a low
of $28.94 in January 2016 (Bloomberg 2016). Part of this is due to the increase in the global supply of
crude oil, resulting from factors like the emergence of the American fracking industry and continued high
output by OPEC. For example, the price of OPEC’s benchmark crude oil has dropped 50% since the
organization refused to cut production in their 2014 meeting in Vienna. This resistance to stabilizing oil
markets has had a large effect on oil prices (Tarver 2015). Furthermore, the supply of oil seems to only
be increasing. End of 2015 metrics placed production at over 9.35 million barrels per day, higher than
February 2015’s forecasted production of 9.3 million barrels per day (Tarver 2015). Due to OPEC’s
actions and the increase in production from American frackers, these elements have resulted in the
establishment of a global oil supply glut. As stated above, oil markets are global, and due to the large
effect of the price of crude oil on gasoline, this has led most nations to experience decreases in the price
of unleaded and diesel gasoline. I have attempted to do my best to isolate the strong effect of these lower
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prices on the average monthly price of unleaded and diesel gasoline, but the possibility remains that the
downward pressure on prices has inadvertently affected my results.
iii. Decreases in Global Demand
Simultaneously, there has been a reduction in the global demand of crude oil and refined oil products.
Global demand of energy products is related to the growth prospects of high-use nations. Global growth
among G7 nations and China has weakened in recent years, as evidenced by a weak 2015 G7 average
GDP growth rate of 1.4% (World Bank 2017). Similarly, there signs that China, the world’s largest oil
importer, might be experiencing a slowing economy. This is inferred through the Chinese devaluation of
the yuan. Finally, the emergence of more fuel-efficient vehicles, alongside these other factors, has placed
downward pressure on global demand, further decreasing the price of crude oil. (Tarver 2015). This is
reflected in the price of gasoline for all nations, including countries in my sample.
iv. Appreciation of the U.S. Dollar
Finally, the U.S. dollar has strengthened in recent years. 2015 marked a 12-year high for the U.S. dollar
versus the euro. This has resulted in a rise in the U.S. dollar index and a decrease in the price of
commodities (Tarver 2015). This decrease in commodity prices is directly linked to the fact that
commodity markets are priced in U.S. dollars.
The four factors of the international nature of oil markets, increases in global supply, decreases in global
demand, and the rise in value of the U.S. dollar are all influences that are difficult to control for and
model appropriately. Therefore, I feel it is important to state that these global influencers may have
affected my results.
b. Empirical Method Considerations
Outside of the global considerations for my study, there are four other factors that could have resulted in
skewing my results. Misidentification of my difference-in-differences country groups, a short time
horizon, incorrect variable manipulations, and the underestimation of refining costs and profit margins
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could all introduce bias into my research. I hope to include these considerations in further study of how
the 2014 Russian Sanctions interact with EU unleaded and diesel gasoline prices.
i. Difference-in-differences Country Group Misidentification
First, regarding my difference-in-differences groups, there exists the possibility of misidentification. I
designed my groups based upon an import reliance of 50% or more crude oil imports from Russia. The
50% mark was an arbitrary percentage, designed to identify countries who showcased extremely high
reliance upon Russian energy. For countries with smaller reliance percentages, say Germany at 28%, this
import percentage is still an extremely high number. German prices should still be affected by an increase
in costs for Rosneft, Transneft, and Gazprom Neft. I aim to experiment with a lower threshold percentage
in further iterations of this research. Additionally, these percentages were computed based upon 2014
import numbers. It would be advantageous to look at an average of Russian crude oil import percentages
over the last five years for my sample to determine a better system of country group determination.
ii. Limited Time Horizons
Secondly, I collected data from January 2008 through December 2015. This is a short time horizon, which
afforded me a limited quantity of observations, especially for time periods after the September 8th, 2014
implementation of the final round of EU sanctions. As more data becomes available over the coming
years, assuming the continued existence of Russian Sanctions targeting Rosneft, Transneft, and Gazprom
Neft, I aim to include more observations in further iterations. This increase in data should provide
additional power for understanding the longer-term effects of the 2014 Russian Sanctions.
iii. Inappropriate Variable Manipulations
Thirdly, it is possible that there exist better variable manipulations than the proportional variables I
designed to account for the effect of crude oil upon unleaded and diesel gasoline prices. A longer lag than
three months could be used. Also under consideration is the use of a differential or logarithmic
manipulation to more appropriately account for crude oil, while still mitigating the large explanatory
variable of crude oil on gasoline prices.
41

iv. Unaccounted Refining Costs and Profit Margin Effects
Lastly, refining costs and profit margins contribute 18% and 17% towards the cost of the average cost of a
gallon of U.S. gasoline (EIA 2014). This is a large contribution. I leveraged fixed effects and a differencein-differences technique to account for this price determinant in my model. However, it is possible that
refining costs and profit margins are not time-invariant. A deeper analysis is currently outside the scope
of this study, but will be undertaken in the future. I fear that refining costs and profit margins may not be
time-invariant due to the historical effects of refining shocks upon U.S. gasoline markets. In 2005, when
Hurricane Katrina struck the southern United States, several oil refineries were damaged and unable to
operate for a time. This resulted in a negative supply shock to the U.S. gasoline market, which led to
higher costs for end users. While no such natural disaster affected European energy markets during my
data collection, we must pay attention to possibility that refining shocks can impact European gasoline
markets. As stated, I hope to develop better methods in the future to model for any such events that could
have affected the European refining sector.

VIII. Conclusion
The 2014 Ukrainian Revolution and the resulting economic sanctions enacted by the EU towards Russia
were some of the most important geo-political events of this decade thus far. Due to the recent nature of
these events and the strong trade ties between Russia and the EU, this is a topic of extreme seriousness
and relevance. on September 8th, 2014, the EU’s final round of Russian Sanctions was put into effect,
targeting three sectors of the Russian economy – defense, finance, and energy. Due to the high use of
gasoline in modern European economies, I chose to focus my study on the sanctioned energy sector,
specifically the unleaded and diesel gasoline markets. Three Russian firms with strong governmental ties
(Rosneft, Transneft, and Gazprom Neft) bore the brunt of the EU sanctions. The primary effect of these
sanctions was a restriction of access to capital for these firms (BBC News 2014). This in turn should have
resulted in higher costs for these firms. As the energy sector constitutes a large share of the entire Russian
economy, and Rosneft, Transneft, and Gazprom Neft constitute a sizeable portion of the Russian energy
sector, it is logical to expect for the increased costs to affect the entire Russian economy (EIA 2017, OEC
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2017). The focus of my study was to determine if the increased costs experienced by Rosneft, Transneft,
and Gazprom Neft were passed onto end gasoline users in the EU. As many EU nations’ gasoline markets
are highly reliant upon Russian oil imports, I hypothesized that this increase in costs would result in
unintentionally higher costs of unleaded and diesel gasoline costs for EU users. I utilized a difference-indifferences model to identify two groups from a 14-nation sample. My groups – a test group, 50% or
more reliant upon Russian crude imports, and a control group, less than 50% reliant on Russian crude oil
imports. From this baseline, I developed a multi-country price determination model that utilized
explanatory variables for the price of Brent crude oil and GDP per capita and dummy variables to account
for post-sanctions times and highly dependent countries. All data was gathered as monthly averages per
country from January 2008 – December 2015. From my difference-in-differences analysis, I found no
statistically significant relationship between the enactment of the 2014 Russian Sanctions and both final
unleaded and diesel gasoline prices for highly dependent EU nations. Due to the importance of this
research, I plan to continue this analysis in the coming years to provide further findings. In conclusion,
my goal was to provide Western foreign policy leaders with greater knowledge of the intentional and
unintentional effects of the use of economic sanctions in response to perceived Russian aggression. I
believe we have done this. I welcome inquiries of my results and look forward to greater discussion of
this imperative topic.
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X.

Appendix

The following appendix attempts to answer any unanswered questions begged by my research and
provides secondary figures and tables that complement the preceding analysis.
a. Further Questions
Question 1 – Why did I not include RBOB Futures?
Gasoline is also an internationally traded commodity. Designated as a future contract, and most
commonly known as RBOB Gasoline futures, the price of RBOB reflects global supply and
demand as a spot price (Edwards 2014). Due to RBOB reflecting all supply and demand
pressures, it is not considered as a viable explanatory variable for this study due to my focus on
local European gasoline price fluctuations.
Question 2 – Why not focus on Russian natural gas imports?
Natural Gas, while similar in many respects to oil, is a much more complicated product to study.
Natural gas is subject to many more seasonal factors than oil and contains greater supply chain
complexity. Due to the limited scope of this study, and the limited seasonality and the inelastic
nature of oil and gasoline, I have chosen to focus my efforts here at this time. In future studies I
hope to include natural gas in my methodology to form a better picture of the impact of the 2014
Russian Sanctions on the entire Russo-European energy market.
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b. Appendix Tables & Figures
Appendix Table 1 – Summary Statistics

Appendix Table 2 – Full RON 95 Regression Output

Appendix Table 3 – Full RON 98 Full Regression Output
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Appendix Table 4 – RON 95 Link Test

Appendix Table 5 – RON 98 Link Test

Appendix Figure 1 – RON 95 Kernel Density Estimate Distribution
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Appendix Figure 2 – RON 98 Kernel Density Estimate Distribution
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Any Further Inquiries May Be Directed To:
Eric S. Peters
Epeter29@vols.utk.edu
University of Tennessee – Knoxville
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